On Armament Traps and How to Get Out of Them: Lessons from Research on Doves

Abstract

Organisms often choose small but immediate rewards over large but delayed rewards, to their long-term detriment. When nations choose to arm for immediate relative advantage over an opponent even though disarming could lead to large but delayed benefits for both parties, their behavior may be understood in this light. Behavioral research with pigeons and humans suggests that the trap-like effects of small immediate rewards can be avoided by arranging delays before the critical choice, or by providing a commitment response that precludes temptation by the small immediate reward. Other methods that have been shown to be effective include signaling the availability of the large reward during the delay, and rewarding alternative behavior that is compatible with choices of the large delayed reward. Applications of these experimental findings to the behavior of nations are suggested, and strategies for avoiding armament traps and acting for the long-term common good are proposed.