

PROPAGANDA AS STIMULUS CONTROL: THE CASE OF THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

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ABSTRACT: This article presents a content analysis of the Bush Administration's public statements reported in the *New York Times* in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The content is categorized into several types of stimulus control operations, including establishing operations, stimulus equivalence, rules, and discriminative stimuli. A heuristic model is developed to help explain how these stimulus control operations produced public consensus for war despite the public's continuing reluctance to endorse military action. Several implications of the behavioral perspective are briefly entertained.

A classic dictionary (*Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, 1961) defines *propaganda* as "any organized or concerted group, effort, or movement to spread particular doctrines, information, etc." (p. 676). One major avenue through which propaganda is disseminated is through the news media. Communication scholars have investigated the propaganda functions of the news media at least since Lasswell's (1927) landmark study *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. Currently, a prominent communication research strategy is to directly examine the functional nature of media content by assessing the effects it produces (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). The functional approach that examines "the correlation of parts of society in responding to the environment" is most closely associated with "propaganda activity—that is, with the production of appropriate responses to problems" through "purposive communication that attempts to persuade" (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991 p. 24-25). The problems alluded to are identified through news content that raises awareness of the pressing concerns and dangers present in the world (cf., Wright, 1986).

Shoemaker and Reese (1991) contend that the functional approach to content analysis is compatible with the "behavioristic tradition," which "examine(s) the effects external to and created by the message" (p. 28). They note that many behavioral analyses stress quantification "in keeping with behavioral stimulus-response psychology; that is, the more frequently a given stimulus is found, the more potent is its presumed effect" (p. 28). But Shoemaker and Reese also recognize that behavioral analyses are not always quantitative since other forms of emphasis besides simple repetition may be used. In the next section, I sketch the parameters of such a nonquantitative behavior analysis.

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Propaganda: A Behavior Analytic Heuristic

The concept of propaganda emphasizes function rather than content—and in doing so, comports nicely with the behavior analytic approach to the understanding of behavior.

From the behavioral perspective, “spread(ing) particular doctrines” describes those stimuli that are intended to prompt the emission of target operant responses of the many people who comprise the citizenry. These antecedent stimuli—the learned and unlearned cues that alter the likelihood of performance of target responses—constitute the content of propaganda.

Four types of antecedent stimuli are employed in the present study of propaganda. An *establishing operation* (EO) alters an organism’s motivation, and thereby changes the effectiveness of reinforcing and discriminative stimuli in controlling behavior (Malott, Whaley, & Malott, 1993; Michael, 1982, 1993). A rule is a verbal stimulus that specifies or describes a behavioral contingency (Malott et al., 1993; Schlinger, 1993). The impact of rules on behavior is somewhat controversial: Some contend that they are basically discriminative stimuli (Cerutti, 1989; Skinner, 1969) while others assert that they are function-altering stimuli (Schlinger, 1993) or perhaps establishing operations (Malott et al., 1993). A *symbol* is a stimulus formed through stimulus equivalence operations; the key notion here is that learned responses come under the control of stimuli that have not been directly associated with reinforcement. In symmetrical relations, “the trained discrimination ‘given A1, pick B1’ leads to the derived discrimination ‘given B1, pick A1’” (Hayes & Hayes, 1989, p. 163). In a transitive relation, “after the discriminations ‘given A1, pick B1’ and ‘given B1, pick C1’ have been taught, ‘given A1, pick C1’ emerges without additional training” (Hayes & Hayes, 1989, p. 163). Finally, a discriminative stimulus (S^D) is a learned cue that evokes a response because that response has been reinforced in the presence, but not the absence, of the stimulus (Michael, 1980); in other words, the operation of a specific behavioral contingency is more probable in the presence of an S^D (Malott, 1989).

How do these four stimulus operations combine when the stimulus function is *propaganda*? The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 allows us to generate a heuristic model to describe the influence of antecedent stimulus control on the target responses of the “U.S. citizen” and perhaps also of the “U.S. congress person.”

To the Bush administration, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait threatened the United States’ economic interests, especially in regard to its the supply of oil. Shortly after the invasion, on August 15, Bush asserted that “our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if all the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of that one man, Saddam Hussein” (Extra, 1991). The administration, therefore, desired an immediate, strong response to Iraq.

But to most Americans, the Iraqi invasion was a relatively weak “natural” establishing operation that would not motivate them to forcefully oppose Iraq nor defend Kuwait. Its weakness likely derived from Americans’ appreciation of the broader context of the relevant geopolitical relations: Iraq was somewhat of a U.S. ally (e.g., in the Iraq-Iran war) and Kuwait was justly perceived as an unfriendly,

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undemocratic, and sexist nation (MacArthur, 1992). Thus, the Iraqi invasion by itself provided insufficient stimulus control to prompt Americans to emit the anti-Iraq behavior that would provide the popular support upon which the Administration could base an aggressive response. The Administration was forced into being the "concerted group" that "spread particular doctrines, information, etc." As MacArthur (1992) described it, "In August 1990, the Bush Administration's task was to sell two images—an ugly one of Hussein and a handsome one of Kuwait—to the American media. Then, God willing, the media would help sell it to the American people" (pg. 43).

In fact, the Bush Administration had the willing media accomplice: The mainstream press primarily reported pro-Administration perspectives and ignored its critics (MacArthur, 1992; Parenti, 1993). "Lacking critical information and argument to the contrary, the public rallied around the troops and treated the war as a just undertaking" (Parenti, 1993, pg. 71).

Thus, the Administration engineered public support for war first, by restricting information, and second, through intense public relations efforts that promoted specific images of both Iraq and Kuwait. These concurrently enacted operations—the restriction of information and the development and dissemination of dogma—comprise the *antecedent stimulus control* commonly termed "propaganda." Though both components are necessarily involved in propaganda stimulus control, it is the manufacture of information that is more complex and interesting from the behavior analytic perspective. It is in the use of information that the operation of the four categories of stimulus control can be identified and their impact on behavior assessed.

The behavioral model or heuristic describing the propaganda targeting Iraq is presented in Figure 1 and described in some detail below. The Bush Administration nurtured establishing operations (EOs) that would motivate citizens to oppose Iraq's action; these included the deliberate use of stimulus equivalence operations to develop symbols. We can summarize these cues as: "Iraq and Hussein are very bad and a threat to our way of life." Simultaneously, the administration asserted rules that specified the alleged contingencies: "Unprovoked aggression by the malevolent must be stopped by the righteous (i.e., the U.S.) or it will be rewarded and encouraged." These antecedent stimuli were intended to evoke specific verbal responses by the "U.S. citizen" that "something" had to be done. These verbal behaviors (response 1 in figure 1), which are termed "patriotic solidarity," were reinforced by peer social approval and by verbal self-statements that acknowledged that "acceptable things were being done" by the Administration. Acceptable "things" (S^{R+}) included diplomatic efforts, the prompting of United Nations action, coalition formation, and various penalties (e.g., sanctions, boycotts, embargoes).

On the other hand, throughout the first months of the Iraqi occupation, the American public's reluctance to endorse massive troop deployment and hasty military fighting (see below) suggests these outcomes were "unacceptable actions" (S^{R-}). As S^D s in the chain, these latter, aversive possibilities were problematic from the Administration's point of view: they prompted verbal behavior from the "U.S. citizen" that was incompatible with Administration efforts to garner popular support

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Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and U.S. propaganda

EO---> RULE CUES---> RESPONSE 1---> S^{R1}
(S^D)---> RESPONSE 2---> S^{R2}

Notes:

EO (Establishing Operation): IRAQ IS VERY BAD AND A DANGER TO OUR WAY OF LIFE

RULE CUES: UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION MUST BE STOPPED BY THE RIGHTEOUS U.S.

RESPONSE 1: VERBAL AGREEMENT BY U.S. CITIZENS AND CONGRESS TO "DO SOMETHING": "*PATRIOTIC SOLIDARITY*"

S^{R1}: SOCIAL REINFORCEMENT AMONG PEERS; VERBAL SELF-STATEMENTS ACKNOWLEDGING THAT "ACCEPTABLE THINGS ARE BEING DONE"

ACCEPTABLE THINGS (S^{R+}):

- * DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
- * PROMPTING U. N. ACTION
- * COALITION FORMATION
- * SANCTIONS/BOYCOTT/EMBARGO

UNACCEPTABLE THINGS (S^{R-}):

- * TROOP DEPLOYMENT
- * MILITARY FIGHTING

S^D (AVERSIVE): TROOP DEPLOYMENT AND MILITARY ACTION

- * PRESENTED WITHIN GRADED STIMULUS HIERARCHY (INITIALLY BELOW THRESHOLD LEVEL NECESSARY TO PROMPT AVOIDANCE OR NONCOMPLIANT RESPONSE)
- * PRESENTED WITH POSITIVE STIMULI
- * OPERATION: *COUNTERCONDITIONING*
HABITUATION TO INCREASINGLY AVERSIVE STIMULI; NO AVOIDANCE (APPROACH MAINTAINED); S^D BECOMES NEUTRAL OR POSITIVE

RESPONSE 2: COGNITIVE, VERBAL, AND OVERT BEHAVIORS THAT "ACCEPT" INCREASED MILITARY ACTIONS: "*PATRIOTIC STOICISM*"

S^{R2}: SOCIAL REINFORCEMENT; SELF-REINFORCEMENT VIA SELF-STATEMENTS

Figure 1. The behavioral chain of the "U.S. citizen": A heuristic.

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for active military intervention.

Therefore, in the five months after the Iraqi invasion, these aversive stimuli (i.e., troop deployment, military action) were presented through the media to the public within a graded stimulus hierarchy. Initially, the aversive stimuli were introduced at a low level—below the threshold necessary to prompt avoidance or noncompliant responses. In addition, the aversive stimuli were paired with positive stimuli such as sanctions and embargoes, diplomatic efforts, alliance building both within the U.N. and independently, and foreign and U.S. diplomatic efforts. This operation continued by pairing increasingly aversive stimuli with the positive ones as habituation to the previous level of aversiveness occurred. Under these conditions, avoidance responses and noncompliant responses were virtually nonexistent and approach responses maintained by the American public and Congress. The aversive S^D s became neutral or even positively valenced as *counterconditioning* proceeded. Thus, the newly conditioned S^D s now prompted cognitive, verbal, and motoric behaviors that “accepted” increased military actions (response 2 in figure 1), as “patriotic stoicism” blossomed on top of the “patriotic solidarity” already established. The final S^{R2} was positive social reinforcement and self-reinforcement, setting the stage for overt military action on January 16, 1991.

The media presentation of Bush administration statements and actions provided the means for the stimulus control to develop and exert its influence. This will be demonstrated in the content analysis presented below, which employs the correlation function strategy (cf., Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). Rather than quantification, the temporal relationship between media messages and subsequent relevant citizen responses is delineated.

METHOD

Source

The *New York Times*, commonly considered the U.S.’s “newspaper of record” (cf. MacArthur, 1992) was selected as the source of propaganda for the study. Parenti (1993) considers the *Times*, along with the *Washington Post*, to be the two most influential American papers, because they and their respective news services provide information to both the public and to other news media as well.

Parenti (1993) includes the three major networks (the Columbia Broadcasting System, the American Broadcasting Company, and the National Broadcasting Company) among the most influential media. However, this content analysis is limited to the print media, represented by the *Times*.

Procedure

Every *New York Times* between August 1, 1990 and January 17, 1991 was reviewed for content pertaining to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. All content concerning Bush administration statements and actions relevant to Iraq or Hussein were considered for inclusion, as were statements by Iraqi leaders and actions by

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Iraq. Content describing domestic reaction (i.e., the public, Congress, military leaders) was also included. Content related directly to Kuwait alone or to the development of the international alliance against Iraq, such as negotiations and meetings, was excluded.

The relevant content was then categorized into one of four types of stimulus control: stimulus equivalence (symbolism), establishing operations, rules, and discriminative stimuli. Additionally, the discriminative stimuli were temporally correlated with public, congressional, and military leader reactions in an effort to demonstrate the operation of the counterconditioning process.

RESULTS

The content analysis is organized by stimulus operation. For each operation, the date the categorized items were reported in the *New York Times* and brief descriptions of the news items are presented first. Following the brief synopsis, extensive quotes or additional context is provided for content items preceded by a star (*). In both the brief synopsis and in the additional context sections, content items that contradict Bush Administration assertions are placed within brackets ([]).

Establishing Operations

As discussed earlier, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by itself was a weak establishing operation; in other words, the invasion alone did not alter the effectiveness of the discriminative and reinforcing stimuli and hence did not impact on the probability of the target response (i.e. "patriotic solidarity"). The Bush administration used the media to develop Iraq as a potent establishing operation through at least six distinct avenues: (1) symbolism (stimulus equivalence), (2) Iraqi "threats" beyond the initial aggression, (3) Iraqi hostage-taking, (4) Iraqi arrogance, (5) Iraqi human rights violations, and (6) Iraqi treachery.

Symbolism (Stimulus Equivalence)

Symmetry

BUSH = CHAMBERLAIN

*AUG 05, 1990 — HADASHOT (ISRAELI DAILY)

Aug 5: Hadashot: "Bush, until now [referring to decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia] at least, resembles Chamberlain in his capitulation to Hitler." [While not a Bush administration statement about Iraq, inclusion seemed justified as background context, i.e. a possible EO for Bush's response to Iraq].

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Transitive

HUSSEIN = UNSPEAKABLE EVIL

A=B: HUSSEIN = HITLER (NEW MATCH)

B=C: HITLER = UNSPEAKABLE EVIL (OLD MATCH)

A=C: HUSSEIN = UNSPEAKABLE EVIL (NEWRELATION)

*AUG 16, 1990 — BUSH

*AUG 21, 1990 — BUSH

*OCT 02, 1990 — BUSH

*OCT 16, 1990 — BUSH

*OCT 17, 1990 — BAKER (Secretary of State)

*OCT 24, 1990 — BUSH

Aug 16: Bush: "A half century ago our nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should, and could, have been stopped. We are not going to make the same mistake again."

Aug 21: Bush: "Half a century ago, the world had a chance to stop a ruthless aggressor and missed it. And I pledge to you, we will not make that mistake again. Together—for you see, together we can successfully oppose tyranny and help those nations who look to us for leadership and vision."

Oct 2: Bush: Speech at U.N.: refers to Hussein as "the dictator."

Oct 16: Bush [commenting on reported Iraqi atrocities]: "Hitler revisited. But remember, when Hitler's war ended, there were the Nuremberg trials."

Oct. 17: Baker: "We made this mistake in the thirties. We did not stand up in opposition to unprovoked aggression. And we remember what happened in Europe when we refused to take a principled stand."

Oct 24: Bush: "I'm reading a great book, and it's a book of history, a great, big thick history about World War II and there's a parallel between what Hitler did to Poland and what Saddam Hussein has done to Kuwait."

N.Y. Times reports that Bush "once again compared" Hussein to Hitler.

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Iraqi "Threats" Beyond Initial Aggression

Troop Strength and Troop Movements

AUG 04: IRAQI TROOPS MASS ON SAUDI ARABIA BORDER
*AUG 08: FITZWATER (White House spokesperson): IMMINENT
THREAT TO SAUDI ARABIA
*AUG 11: IRAQI ARMY ESTIMATED AT 1,000,000, "4TH
LARGEST"
SEPT 24: IRAQ THREATENS ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA
*NOV 20: IRAQ TO SEND 250,000 MORE TROOPS TO BORDER
AREA
*DEC 14: IRAQ'S "MASSIVE MILITARY MACHINE"

Aug 8: Fitzwater: "There have been changes of a sort that cause us to believe there is a growing and continuous threat to Saudi Arabia."

Aug 11: But only 400,000-500,000 are "first line" troops.

Nov 20: Iraq sends 250,000 additional troops to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Dec 14: US announces sanctions to remain even if Iraq withdraws due to fear of Iraq's "massive military machine."

Iraq's Unconventional Weapons

Chemical.

AUG 08: SAUDIS FEAR USE
*AUG 09: "TO BAGDAD, POISON GAS IS 'POOR MAN'S
A-BOMB'"
SEPT 25: IRAQ PREPARING DECONTAMINATION SITES
OCT 08: ISRAELIS RECEIVE GAS MASKS
*NOV 23: BUSH TALKS TO TROOPS IN DESERT
DEC 27: PENTAGON WARNS OF LIKELY USE AGAINST U.S.

Aug 9: *N.Y. Times* headline.

Nov 23: Bush to troops: "A dictator who has gassed his own people, innocent women and children, unleashing chemical weapons of mass destruction, weapons that were considered unthinkable in the civilized world for over 70 years."

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Nuclear.

- *NOV 18: IRAQ COULD HAVE BOMB WITHIN 10 YEARS
- *NOV 23: BUSH TO TROOPS IN DESERT
- *NOV 25: CHENEY, SCOWCROFT RAISE CONCERNS
- [*NOV 28: International Atomic Energy Agency: IRAQ NOT
DIVERTING NUCLEAR FUEL]
- [*NOV 30: U.S. INTELLIGENCE LACKING ("MUSH")]
- *DEC 23: "IRAQ'S NUCLEAR QUEST: TENTACLES IN FOUR
CONTINENTS"—*N.Y. TIMES* HEADLINE

Nov 18: *NY Times* reports that U.S., British, and Israeli intelligence believe Iraq could have nuclear weapons within 10 years. Consequently, Iraqi threats must be taken more seriously.

Nov 23: Bush to troops: "And let me say this, those who would measure Saddam Hussein's, those who would measure the timetable for Saddam's atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of the situation and the gravity of the threat. Every day that passes brings Saddam one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that's why, more and more, your mission is marked by a real sense of urgency. You know, no one knows precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic weapons, or exactly who they may be aimed at down the road. But we do know this for sure: He has never possessed a weapon he didn't use."

Nov 25: Cheney (Secretary of Defense): "A (crude atomic) weapon might be developed (by Iraq) in a year or less."

Scowcroft (National Security Advisor): Waiting for sanctions to work "raises the possibility that we could face an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons, which would change the character of any conflict."

[Nov 28: International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iraq's stock of nuclear fuel has not been diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.]

[Nov 30: *N.Y. Times* analysis: Bush's recent remarks were based on a secret report of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. Government officials who have read the report noted it is full of caveats and qualifications omitted by Administration public statements. "The estimate is said to be based on the assumption that Iraq will mount a crash program to build a bomb, that it will use its only known stocks of enriched uranium, which were inspected by international officials last week and deemed intact, and that Iraq possesses advanced bomb-making technology. Even then, the estimate concludes, the bomb would be low-yield, too bulky to deliver by missile or even by aircraft, and might not detonate."]

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Dec. 23: Despite the Nov. 30 analysis, the *Times* offered this inflammatory headline and asserted that Iraq could produce nuclear weapons within the decade.

Biological.

DEC 28: CIA REPORTS IRAQI POSSESSION; GI'S
VACCINATED
DEC 29: BRITAIN TO VACCINATE ITS TROOPS
JAN 06: ARMY READY FOR "GERM WARFARE"

Iraq Takes Hostages

*AUG 19: IRAQ DETAINS CIVILIANS AS "HUMAN SHIELDS"
AUG 24: HUSSEIN SHOWS HOSTAGES ON TV
[*AUG 30: TV CRITIC REVIEWS THE SHOW]
*SEPT 04: HOSTAGE RELEASE DELAYED (NO LANDING
RIGHTS)
*OCT 19: U.S. EMBASSY SHREDS PAPER IN FEAR

Aug 19: Iraq declares blockade an "act of war" and takes hostages.

Aug 30: *N.Y. Times* TV critic: "All one could think of as he [Hussein] spoke for half an hour was how the children were feeling. They were so still. Were they frightened by the big man with the big moustache and his escort of officers? Melodrama bulks so large on television that even reality conforms to its rules. It was enough to blow the cool of some correspondents."

Sept 4: Iraq refuses to grant foreign airlines landing rights in Iraq, thus delaying any hostage release.

Oct 19: U.S. Embassy shreds papers, lacking confidence that Iraq will observe diplomatic protocol "forever."

Iraqi Arrogance

*AUG 09: HUSSEIN DECLARES KUWAIT ANNEXED
OUTRIGHT
*AUG 26: AT U.N.: IRAQ WILL "BURN ALL"
*OCT 04: HUSSEIN: "BUSH CAN'T DO WHAT HE SAYS."
OCT 10: HUSSEIN THREATENS ISRAEL
*NOV 20: INCREASED TROOPS: "IRAQI SUPERIORITY"
*NOV 28: AT U.N.: IRAQ "WILL NEVER SUCCUMB TO
PRESSURE"

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NOV 30: HUSSEIN DEFIES U.N. RESOLUTION
AUTHORIZING
FORCE AGAINST IRAQ
JAN 07: HUSSEIN: IRAQ PREPARED FOR WAR TO KEEP
KUWAIT
JAN 10: HUSSEIN: U.S. FORCES WILL "SWIM IN THEIR
OWN BLOOD"
JAN 11: AZIZ (Iraqi Foreign Minister) REFUSES BUSH'S
LETTER TO HUSSEIN
JAN 12: HUSSEIN: PREPARE FOR "HOLY WAR"

Aug 9: Iraq declares "merger" in response to U.S. troop deployment.

Aug 26: Iraqi delegate to the U.N., after the Security Council adopted a resolution permitting the use of force to effect the blockade: The "use of force...will lead inevitably to a number of explosions which will burn all in their path."

Oct 4: Hussein visits his troops in Kuwait: "Bush can't do what he says."

Nov 20: Hussein sends 250,000 new troops to Kuwait and Southern Iraq, providing "Iraqi superiority" that he says can't be matched.

Nov 28: Iraqi Foreign Minister, in response to U.N. draft of resolution offering Iraq "one final opportunity" to pull out by mid-January: Iraq "will never succumb to pressure."

Iraqi Human Rights Violations

*OCT 17: FLEEING KUWAITIS REPORT ATROCITIES AND
EXECUTIONS
*OCT 23: BUSH: "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY"
*OCT 27: U.S. WARNS OF TERRORIST ATTACK ON
PASSENGER SHIP
*OCT 30: BUSH AND BAKER RECOUNT ATROCITIES
*OCT 31: U.S. AND BRITISH HOSTAGES REPORTED TO
SUFFER MOST
*NOV 01: BUSH: HOSTAGES AT AMERICAN EMBASSY
"STARVED"
*NOV 02: BUSH: HUSSEIN "BRUTAL DICTATOR", WORSE
THAN HITLER
*DEC 02: REFUGEES PROVIDE ADDITIONAL REPORTS OF
TERROR
[*DEC 16: N.Y. TIMES: ESTIMATES OF VIOLATIONS LOWER
FROM HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS]

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[*DEC 20: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ISSUED:
VIOLATIONS LOWER]

Oct 17: Reports of terror by fleeing Kuwaitis are unconfirmed but consistent.

Oct 24: Bush: Iraqi army committing "crimes against humanity" and "there can never be any compromise, any compromise, with this kind of aggression."

Oct 27: *N.Y. Times* reports U.S. warning that is "most direct and detailed" to date.

Oct 30: Bush: Siege on foreign embassies "unconscionable and inhumane."

Baker: "It is a story of barbarism in its most crude and evil form, the rape of Kuwait. Many of the reports seem unbelievable." He cited examples: An Iraqi soldier shot two sick children, "'curing them' in his words"; "Iraqi soldiers released the lions and tigers [at the Kuwait Zoo], and then tried to shoot them for target practice. Their efforts, however, were not entirely successful. A lion escaped and mauled a young Kuwaiti girl."

Oct 31: French hostages who were released reported that U.S. and British hostages suffered most, serving as "human shields" at army plants.

Nov 1: Bush: U.S. Embassy officials are being "starved" by Hussein and mistreated in other ways. "I have had it with that kind of treatment of Americans."

Nov 2: Bush: "The brutal dictator" is worse than Hitler in terms of using hostages as human shields. Asked how Hussein could be worse than the man responsible for the Holocaust, Bush said: "I didn't say the Holocaust. I mean that is outrageous. But I think brutalizing young kids in a square in Kuwait is outrageous too. I was told that Hitler did not stake people out against potential military targets and that he did, indeed respect—not much else, but he did indeed respect the legitimacy of the embassies. So we've got some differences there."

[Dec 16: According to Middle East Watch and Amnesty International, Iraq has committed violations of human rights but they are much less than reported in the press. The director of Middle East Watch said: "We deplore and would never want to minimize the grave human rights abuses taking place in Kuwait. But neither do we wish to see them overstated or exaggerated in an exercise to whip up war fever." An interviewer who conducted hundreds of interviews in compiling the report concluded: "We simply cannot find persuasive evidence of the thousands of deaths and mass rapes and many of the other abuses that have been reported in the press." The human rights groups confirmed 250 deaths rather than the thousands alleged.]

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[Dec 20: Amnesty International official report confirmed torture and abuses but deaths were in the hundreds not the thousands as reported.]

Iraqi Treachery

*AUG 5: N.Y. TIMES: HUSSEIN: "ARAB OF VAST AMBITION"
*AUG 12: U.S. VITAL INTERESTS IN GULF
*OCT 08: IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WOULD LEAVE HUSSEIN AS THREAT
OCT 17: IRAQI COMPROMISE OVERTURE REJECTED BY U.S.
[OCT 22: SAUDIS HINT AT COMPROMISE]
[OCT 23: HUSSEIN DISCUSSES HOSTAGE RELEASE]
*OCT 24: BUSH: "MORE DETERMINED THAN EVER"
*NOV 02: BUSH REFUSES TO CLOSE EMBASSY TO AVOID CONFLICT
NOV 16: REJECTION OF HUSSEIN OFFER TO NEGOTIATE
NOV 27: U.S.: IRAQ'S GOAL HIGH U.S. CASUALTIES IN LOSING EFFORT
*DEC 7: BUSH LUKEWARM TO FREEING OF ALL HOSTAGES
DEC 18: BAKER FEARS "PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL PLOY"
*DEC 19: U.S.: PARTIAL PULLOUT A "NIGHTMARE SCENARIO"
DEC 27: PENTAGON: IRAQ LIKELY TO ATTACK ISRAEL
JAN 05: BUSH: GENEVA MEETING ONLY TO "INFORM" IRAQ OF CONDITIONS

Aug 5: N.Y. Times analysis: "The Iraqi sees himself as destined to dominate his [Arab] world."

Aug 12: N.Y. Times reports that U.S. has vital interest in the region: money, oil prices, control of oil, friendly nations, border integrity.

Oct 8: Iraqi unconditional withdrawal and call for free elections in Kuwait "would leave Saddam Hussein with his army and his nuclear and biological capabilities as well as his chemical arsenal intact" (anonymous foreign diplomat, echoed by Administration officials).

Oct 24: Bush: "I am more determined than ever to see that this invading dictator gets out of Kuwait with no compromise of any kind whatsoever."

Nov 2: Bush refuses to close the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait on principle, though keeping it open increases the likelihood of armed conflict.

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Dec 7: Bush welcomed Hussein's announcement that all hostages would be freed, but insisted that Iraq must withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait.

Dec 19: "We can't let him [Hussein] maneuver us into a position where the stakes seem too petty to fight over, which is what he seems determined to do," according to a senior intelligence official. A pledge by Hussein to vacate all but a fraction of Kuwait and/or withdraw after the U.N. deadline would "complicate our position enormously." It would be "the nightmare scenario facing us" in the words of a second official.

Rules (Contingency-specifying Stimuli)

The Bush Administration introduced several rules that specified the contingencies to be invoked by the U.S. in response to the Iraqi invasion. The two primary rules declared that "Iraq must be punished" and that "the U.S. must prevail." These rules were asserted as inflexible and nonnegotiable dicta. Their function in the propaganda effort was to prompt the emission by the public of the "patriotic solidarity" responses.

Iraq's Actions Are Bad and Iraq Must Be Stopped/Punished

Unprovoked Aggression Must Be Stopped

*AUG 06:	BUSH
*AUG 09:	BUSH
*AUG 16:	BUSH
*AUG 21:	BUSH
*SEPT 05:	BAKER
*SEPT 12:	BUSH
*OCT 18:	BAKER
[*OCT 21:	DOLE: CONFLICT ABOUT OIL]
*OCT 24:	BUSH

Aug 6: Bush at news conference: "Iraq, having committed brutal, naked aggression must get out" of Kuwait... "The vicious aggression against Kuwait... speaks for itself... these are outlaws—international outlaws and renegades."

Aug 9: Bush: "A line has been drawn in the sand."

Aug 16: Bush: Iraqi aggression threatens "our way of life."

Aug 21: Bush: "Iraq's invasion... was a ruthless assault on the very essence of international order and civilized ideals."

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Sept 5: Baker to House Foreign Affairs Committee: "(W)e face a simple choice. Do we want to live in a world where aggression is made less likely because it is met with a powerful response...a world where civilized rules of conduct apply? Or are we willing to live in a world where aggression can go unchecked, where aggression succeeds because we somehow cannot muster the collective will to challenge it?... (W)e must seize the opportunity to solidify the ground rules of the new order...we must show that intimidation and force are not successful ways of doing business...anywhere..."

Sept 12: Bush to Congress: Hussein "is literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the earth."

Oct 18: Baker: "If we were willing to go for that [compromise], we would be permitting an aggressor to profit from his aggression...We are indeed unwilling to participate in a search for a partial solution."

[Oct 21: *N.Y. Times* reported Senator Dole contradicted the rule one week earlier when he said: "America is in the Gulf for one reason only—O-I-L—and that is not something parents are anxious for their sons and daughters to die for."]

Oct 24: Bush: "What happens in Bagdad matters in Burlington, because our concern, far beyond the price of oil, is the fate of sovereign nations. There's a moral underpinning, a strong moral underpinning to what's happened in the United Nations as we've stood up unanimously against Saddam Hussein's aggression—a world order, free from unlawful aggression, free from violence, free from plunder."

Bush: "It isn't oil that we're concerned about, it is aggression, and this aggression is not going to stand."

Taking Hostages Must Be Opposed

*AUG 19:	BUSH
*AUG 21:	BUSH
*SEPT 12:	BUSH
*NOV 02:	BUSH

Aug 19: Bush: Taking hostages "totally unacceptable (and) contrary to international law and indeed to all accepted norms of international conduct."

Aug 21: Bush: "And now, in a further offense against all norms of international behavior, Iraq has imposed restrictions on innocent civilians from many countries. This is unacceptable."

Sept 12: Bush to Congress: "America and the world will not be blackmailed by this ruthless policy."

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Nov 2: Bush: "The Embassy should remain open because I don't believe a dictator should violate international law by starving out or isolating another person's embassy. I think there's a fundamental principle in that."

The U.S. Is Good/Right and Must Get Its Way

*AUG 21: BUSH
*AUG 21: BUSH
*AUG 21: BUSH
*SEPT 07: BUSH

Aug 21: Bush to Veterans of Foreign Wars convention: "We're engaged in a cause larger than ourselves...(quoting General Eisenhower addressing Allied forces) 'The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you...Let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking'."

Aug 21: Bush at political fund-raiser: "I took this action, not out of some national hunger for conflict, but out of the moral responsibility, shared by so many committed nations around the world, to protect our world from fundamental evil."

Aug 21: Bush: "America will not be intimidated...America stands where it always has, against aggression, against those who would use force to replace the rule of law."

Sept 7: Bush: "Our cause may not be easy but it will always be right."

Discriminative Stimuli

The introduction of establishing operations and rules combined to produce the responses from the populace that have been termed "patriotic solidarity"—the verbal agreement "to do something." These verbal statements were socially reinforced (S^{R1}) by other statements that described the "acceptable" initiatives of the Bush administration: the diplomatic efforts, the prompting of United Nations action, the coalition formation, and the imposition of economic punishments (sanctions, boycotts, embargoes). "Patriotic solidarity" verbalizations at this point did not produce verbalizations that endorsed massive troop deployment and actual military fighting. These initiatives were "unacceptable" to the public and constituted aversive stimuli. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration employed a mechanism—counterconditioning—to introduce these aversive stimuli into the behavior chain and maintain the compliant behavior of the public.

In terms of the behavior chain depicted in Figure 1, S^{R1} reinforced Response 1 ("patriotic solidarity") and also functioned as a discriminative stimulus (S^D) for Response 2 ("patriotic stoicism"). The Bush Administration was able to maintain

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"patriotic solidarity" (Response 1) and prompt "patriotic stoicism" (Response 2) by using the acceptable initiatives as the combination reinforcing-discriminative stimuli and then pair those positive stimuli with the unacceptable aversive initiatives. These noxious S^Ds were introduced on a graded stimulus hierarchy: The early stimuli were presented in weakened versions that were below the threshold level necessary to prompt avoidance or noncompliant behavior. Because these weakened aversive stimuli were paired with the positive ones (diplomacy, alliance building, economic consequences, etc.) the process corresponds to that of *counterconditioning*: the organism habituates to increasingly intense aversive stimuli while maintaining approach behavior. The aversive S^D becomes a neutral or even positive stimulus. In the present heuristic, Response 2 encompasses those cognitive, verbal, and overt behaviors that "accept" increased military actions—what I have above termed "patriotic stoicism."

In the next section, the operation of this counterconditioning process will be illustrated by presenting, first, the Bush Administration pronouncements that form the basis for the citizens' S^Ds, and second, the indices of the popular response (Response 2). Over the course of the 5 1/2 months, though the S^Ds become increasingly noxious, the "approach" responses of the populace are maintained with only sporadic evidence of incompatible avoidance or noncompliant responses (e.g., see mid-November below). In fact, most of the very limited noncompliant behavior was emitted in December 1990 by current and former public officials—rather than by the public.

Counterconditioning Noxious S^Ds

Graded Stimulus Hierarchy:

Noxious Discriminative Stimuli

Public Response (Response 2)

August 1990

*AUG 04: VERBAL INDICANT: MILITARY
INTERVENTION (MI)

*AUG 09: U.S. MAY SEND 50,000 TROOPS *AUG 09: "CAUTIOUS SUPPORT"
76% YES TO EMBARGO
66% YES TO TROOPS
40% TROOPS TOO SOON
48% DIPLOMACY FAILED

*AUG 11: TROOP ESTIMATE 100,000

*AUG 14: POSSIBLE CALL-UP OF
SOME RESERVISTS

*AUG 18: BUSH APPROVES RESERVE CALL-UP

AUG 19: LARGEST FORCE SINCE VIETNAM

*AUG 21: "FEW PROTEST
BUSH'S BIG STICK"

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*AUG 22: 40,000 RESERVISTS
CALLED UP

AUG 22: BUSH POPULARITY
SOARS: 77% YES
TO TROOPS TO
SAUDI ARABIA

*AUG 25: MILITARY RECOMMENDS ALL-OUT
RESPONSE TO AN IRAQI ATTACK
ON SAUDI ARABIA.

Aug 4: "Top American officials indicated that military intervention of some kind was rising rapidly to the top of the list of options." U.S. to ask U.N. to boycott Iraq.

Aug 9: U.S. may send 50,000 troops to Gulf.

N.Y. Times headline: "Around U.S., a cautious chorus of support."

Aug 11: *N.Y. Times* headline: "In just 2 days, a doubling of U.S. troop estimate."

Aug 14: Reservists may be called up—tens of thousands but not full call up of 200,000.

Aug 18: *N.Y. Times*: The Administration is "reluctant to disclose the full extent of its military commitment" ...20,000-plus in Saudi Arabia, 35,000 on 59 ships in Gulf, 45,000 marines on the way.

Aug 21: Support is evident from the left and the right as long as any action is defensive and of relatively short duration.

Aug 22: 40,000 reservists may not be the limit.

Aug 25: Top military commanders recommend all-out response if Iraq invades Saudi Arabia. On Aug 26, U.S. officials emphasized that an Iraqi attack will set off a huge military response by the U.S.

September 1990

*SEPT 01: SCHWARTZKOPF: FORCE IS
DEFENSIVE (OFFENSIVE "HYPOTHETICAL")
*SEPT 05: BAKER: U.S. FORCES TO STAY
EVEN IF IRAQ WITHDRAWS
*SEPT 06: U.S. TO REVIEW OPTIONS
*SEPT 07: OFFENSIVE MI POSSIBLE BY 10/15
*SEPT 10: U.S. AND U.S.S.R. PLEDGE ACTION
*SEPT 12: BUSH HINTS AT FORCE

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*SEPT 15: FIRST COMBAT: U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN SHIPS FIRE WARNING SHOTS
*SEPT 16: BUILD-UP TO GIVE MORE WAR OPTIONS; AIR FORCE CHIEF REVEALS FIGHT PLANS
*SEPT 18: AIR FORCE CHIEF DISMISSED FOR "POOR JUDGMENT AT A SENSITIVE TIME"
*SEPT 20: BUSH MORE OPEN ON WAR OPTION
*SEPT 27: BUSH OPTION INCLUDES OFFENSIVE FORCE *SEPT 27: SUPPORT FOR MI CONDITIONAL
*SEPT 29: SCOWCROFT: TIME IS SHORT
DOD CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL RESERVE CALL-UP

Sept 1: General Schwartzkopf (Commander of Coalition Forces): "There is not going to be any war unless the Iraqis attack." The force is "for the defense of Saudi Arabia" and discussions of offensive force are only "hypothetical."

Sept 5: Baker tells Congress that the U.S. intends to maintain a long-term military presence in the Gulf even if Iraq withdraws.

Sept 6: U.S. must have patience, then "we will review our options," according to an administration official, implying a threat to use force.

Sept 7: Administration officials assert that the U.S. will have sufficient troops and equipment to mount an offensive attack by October 15.

Sept 10: U.S. and U.S.S.R. pledge to reverse Iraqi conquest of Kuwait "even if that cannot be accomplished peacefully." But Gorbachev refused to explicitly endorse military action. Bush observed "we may have a difference on that."

Sept 12: Bush to Congress on Sept 11: "Iraq will not be permitted to annex Kuwait." He hints at use of force, declaring America's credibility as a superpower is at stake.

Sept 15: "American warship fires warning shot at Iraqi tanker."

Sept 16: Troop build-up to give Bush "additional military options."

General Dugan (Air Force Chief) writes in the *Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times* that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that heavy bombing of Bagdad will be necessary to force Iraqi withdrawal. "The cutting edge would be downtown Bagdad. If I want to hurt you, it would be at home..."

Sept 18: Cheney dismissing Dugan on Sept 17: "To speculate about what may or may not be included in a plan that might or might not be implemented is

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inappropriate.” [Note that Dugan’s remarks upset the stimulus hierarchy; on September 19, the *Times* observed that Dugan’s mistake was one of timing not content.]

Sept 20: Bush: “We are, as I have said before, prepared to take additional steps if sanctions and the quest for a political resolution do not work....We will continue to review all options with our allies...” Aides said this represented a “nuance” not a change in policy. The *Times* specifically noted that “the White House has tied its talk of ‘options’ to the idea of expanding the current sanctions.”

Sept 27: A *N.Y. Times* news analysis concluded that the receptions Bush received and opinion polls show that an overwhelming majority backs his moves to date—which are purportedly defensive. “So far Mr. Bush has sought support only for defensive action: guarding Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations. Neither the White House nor anyone else really knows how enthusiastic the public would be, and for how long, about a desert campaign against the Iraqi army or an air offensive.”

Sept 29: Scowcroft (National Security Advisor): the systematic destruction “of Kuwait by Iraq shortens the time that the U.S. can wait for sanctions to take effect.” The Department of Defense (DOD) begins to debate the call-up of additional combat reservists to join the 27,000 support reservists already called up.

October 1990

- | | | |
|----------|---|---|
| *OCT 12: | KEY UNITS REACH SAUDI ARABIA;
32 DEATHS REPORTED (“ACCIDENTS”) | |
| *OCT 16: | CHENEY: “IN FOR THE LONG HAUL”
U.S. BUILD-UP OF TROOPS
CONTINUES | |
| | | OCT 18: CONGRESS WANTS
RIGHT TO
APPROVE WAR |
| *OCT 20: | U.S. TO SEND 400-500 TANKS
BUSH: “CONSIDER ALL OPTIONS” | |
| *OCT 21: | ADMINISTRATION: MILITARY THREAT
NEEDS MORE CREDIBILITY | |
| *OCT 24: | U.S. CONSIDERS INCREASING FORCE
BEYOND 240,000 | |
| | | OCT 25: CONGRESS WANTS
RIGHT TO
RECONVENE |
| *OCT 26: | U.S. TO ADD AS MANY AS
100,000 TROOPS
DEFENSIVE NOW OFFENSIVE
CHENEY: “NO UPPER CEILING” | |

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OCT 30: "BUSH AND BAKER EXPLICIT IN
THREAT TO USE FORCE": *TIMES*
HEADLINE

*OCT 31: FITZWATER: SANCTIONS
UNLESS... OCT 31: CONGRESS URGES
PATIENCE; BUSH
DOMESTIC POLICY
UNPOPULAR

Oct 12: American deaths in Gulf-related moves reaches 32 in "accidents."

Oct 16: Cheney: U.S. forces in Gulf are "in for the long haul."
U.S. build up is to give Bush "additional military options";
Times observes that the distinction between defensive and offensive force is reduced.

Oct 20: U.S. to send 400-500 tanks; Bush reiterates tough stand ("prepared to consider all options").

Oct 21: Administration official: unless the effect of the sanctions increases, "we will have to make the military threat more credible."

Oct 24: U.S. announcement of possible troop increase follows Saudi hint at compromise (Iraq to keep some territory) and Hussein's discussion of freeing hostages. An increased force is seen as a sign of offensive preparations.

Oct 26: Cheney announces up to 100,000 additional troops would be sent to gulf. At this time, the U.S. had 210,000 of the planned 240,000 troops there. The exact number was not worked out yet, but there was "no upper ceiling." More troops provide "a range of options should another option be necessary...to deal with any contingency."

Oct 31: Fitzwater: The Administration will adhere to sanctions as the major intervention unless "circumstance or a provocation" indicate otherwise.

November 1990

*NOV 01: FITZWATER: "GET PEOPLE READY
FOR ANY EVENTUALITY"

*NOV 02: SCHWARTZKOPF: WAR "ANYTIME"
BUT NOT SOON

*NOV 05: U.S. TO ACTIVATE COMBAT RESERVES.

*NOV 08: U.S. TO ADD 100,000 (350,000 TOTAL)

*NOV 09: BUSH ORDERS 150,000 ADDITIONAL TROOPS
(380,000 TOTAL) TO GIVE OPTION
OF OFFENSIVE MI

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*NOV 10:	U.S. WILL NOT ROTATE TROOPS DURING CRISIS		
NOV 11:	TOP MILITARY OFFICER: OFFENSIVE MI NOW POSSIBLE		
		[*NOV 12:	CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS DEBATE WAR OPTION]
		NOV 14:	CONGRESS WANTS SPECIAL SESSION
*NOV 15:	BUSH: POLICY SAME BUT OFFENSIVE MI CREDIBLE	NOV 15:	AMERICANS UNEASY AND FEARFUL
		[*NOV 17:	SINCE NOV 8, ANTIWAR ACTIVITY]
		NOV 20:	BUSH SUPPORT DROPS TO 50% (BELLICOSITY)
NOV 22:	ARMY CAN HALT RETIREMENTS, EXTEND ENLISTMENTS INDEFINITELY		
NOV 24:	BUSH "TIRED OF STATUS QUO," WANTS U.N. OK		
*NOV 25:	ADMINISTRATION DOUBTS SANCTIONS, "NOT PREPARED" TO WAIT		
*NOV 27:	DRAFT OF U.N. RESOLUTION APPROVING FORCE; ARMY EXTENDS ENLISTMENTS INDEFINITELY		
		[*NOV 29:	FORMER MILITARY CHIEFS URGE DELAY]
*NOV 30:	U.N. AUTHORIZES FORCE		

Nov 1: Bush intensifies war of words with Iraq. *N.Y. Times*: Bush and Baker "underlining the threat of force." Fitzwater: "get people ready for any eventuality."

Nov 2: Schwartzkopf: Military action must be cautious and limited to avoid upsetting balance of power and stability in region; war "anytime" but not soon.

Nov 5: U.S. to activate more combat reservists.

Nov 8: U.S. to add 100,000 troops by mid-December to bring force to 350,000.

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Nov 9: Bush orders 150,000 additional troops to provide force of 380,000. "I have today directed the Secretary of Defense to increase the size of the U.S. forces committed to Desert Shield to insure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option..."

Nov 10: U.S. will not rotate troops during crisis; troops will remain until crisis over.

[Nov 12: Senator Nunn: no troop rotation is "fast track to war."]

Nov 15: Bush tries to placate Congress: Policy has not changed, the doubling of troops is "to make the threat of offensive action more credible."

[Nov 17: *Times* reports Congress and left-liberal publications increase the questions of and/or opposition to current policy.]

Nov 25: Administration officials doubt sanctions can have impact, the earliest possible time would be spring: "We're not prepared to give this guy unlimited time."

Nov 27: U.N. resolution to give "one final opportunity" for withdrawal.

[Nov 29: Two former Chairs of Joint Chiefs of Staff urge delay of military action for at least a year to give sanctions time to work; this follows recent comments by Schwartzkopf and Gray (Marine Corp Commander) also counseling patience.]

Nov 30: U.N. authorizes force after Jan 15.

December 1990

		[*DEC 03:	FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARIES URGE DELAY]
*DEC 04:	CHENEY TO CONGRESS: MI NECESSARY; CALL-UP LIMIT RAISED FOR RESERVISTS (FROM 125,000 TO 188,000)		
		DEC 05:	HOUSE DEMOCRATS WANT CONGRESS TO APPROVE MI
		[*DEC 06:	CIA DIRECTOR: SANCTIONS WILL IMPACT; DEMOCRATS ATTACK BUSH]
DEC 07-12:	HOSTAGES FREED AND LEAVE; U.S. EMBASSY CLOSED		

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DEC 13-17: U.S. AND IRAQ FAIL TO AGREE ON TALKS
DEC 14: 48% WAIT PAST 1/15
40% START OFFENSIVE MI 1/15
[DEC 20: U.S. GENERAL WALKER: FORCES NOT READY BY 1/15]
*DEC 21: PENTAGON: TROOPS WILL BE READY
*DEC 22: CHENEY: FORCE LIKELY
*DEC 27: BUSH WILL NOT HEED ARMY DESIRE FOR DELAY
[DEC 30/31: PRESSURE ON BUSH FOR TALKS INCREASES]

[Dec 3: Majority of former Defense Secretaries urge patience, give sanctions additional time to work.]

Dec 4: Cheney tells congress military intervention, not sanctions, will be necessary to effect withdrawal. Call-up limit for reservists raised from 125,000 to 188,000.

[Dec 6: Webster (CIA Director) in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee: Sanctions' impact to be felt by Spring (3-9 months), particularly on Iraqi military.]

Dec 21: Pentagon seeks to minimize damage from remarks a day earlier by General Walker, second in command, that U.S. forces will not be ready for offensive action on Jan 15.

Dec 22: Cheney to troops: "It increasingly looks like...we'll have to use force to get him [Hussein] out."

Dec 27: The *N.Y. Times* reports that aides say the Army warning will not stop Bush from ordering action: "The military are always more comfortable with more time."

January 1991

*JAN 2: BUSH AND ADVISORS MEET
*JAN 2: REPORT SANCTIONS WORKING
*JAN 4: BUSH OFFERS GENEVA MEETING
[JAN 4: SUPPORT FOR WAR LOW]
*JAN 6: BUSH: DELAY WILL GIVE HUSSEIN MORE TIME

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JAN 9:	BUSH SEEKS CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR MI	JAN 9:	CBS/N.Y. <i>TIMES</i> POLL: 50% YES TO FORCE ON 1/15
*JAN 10:	CHENEY SEEKS EMERGENCY AUTHORITY TO RETAIN RESERVISTS U.S.	JAN 10-12:	CONGRESS DEBATES WAR
JAN 11:	BAKER AND SAUDI KING FAHD DISCUSS TIMING OF ATTACK		
JAN 12:	BAKER: U.S. TO STRIKE SOON	[*JAN 12:	ANTIWAR ADS APPEAR]
		JAN 13:	CONGRESS BACKS ATTACK
JAN 14:	BAKER: ALLIES AGREE ON NECESSITY FOR AND TIMING OF ATTACK	*JAN 14:	AMERICAN "FEAR AND RESOLVE"
		JAN 15:	55% AGREE BUSH DID EVERYTHING TO AVOID WAR
JAN 16:	U.S. WEIGHS TIMING OF ATTACK		
JAN 17:	<i>TIMES</i> HEADLINE: U.S. AND ALLIES OPEN AIR WAR ON IRAQ		
	LATE JAN:		75% APPROVAL RATING FOR BUSH

Jan 2: Bush and advisors meet to review options amid reports that sanctions are working and food rationing in Iraq has intensified.

Jan 4: *N.Y. Times*: "The latest move on an increasingly muddled diplomatic exchange with Iraq." The meeting is for public consumption, to quiet public debate and raise support for war.

Jan 6: Bush: "Delay may give Saddam more time to prepare..." He sends letter to Hussein: "Withdraw...or face the terrible consequences."

Jan 10: Cheney seeks emergency authority to keep reservists in military for two years. U.S. reveals plans for massive air strikes.

Jan 11-15: U.S. and Allies discuss timing of attack.

[Jan 12: A full page ad in the *Times* showed a massive cemetery, and under it: "Talk is cheaper."]

Jan 14: *N.Y. Times*: "(O)n the eve of war... the United States was a nation divided." Many supported "the right more precious than peace" while many others participated in antiwar protests. "And everywhere lurked undercurrents that were

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not easy to define—a sense that the crisis was moving inexorably out of control, that one's own voice had been lost in the rush of events."

DISCUSSION

In one sense, the content analysis presented here details the obvious: Government controls information and its dissemination and thereby controls the target response of the populace. This power was evident years ago; for example, the Nazi's effective use of propaganda led to the establishment of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1937, which tried to alert school children to the insidious techniques of "name calling," "glittering generalities," and "card stacking," among others (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). Obviously, these techniques not only endured but prospered, most recently resurfacing in the Bush administration's effort to marshal public opinion in favor of military action in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

The ability of government to control information increased markedly after World War Two as government centralization provided routines that institutionalized control (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). The Reagan presidency refined the "public relations model of information management" (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991, p. 109). The White House, various federal departments, and the Pentagon (with its own public relations staff of over 3000) disseminate information and misinformation to suit their own purposes (Parenti, 1993). The White House, for example, decides on a daily basis what information it wants covered and how: Reagan's former chief of staff succinctly confirmed that stories were routinely planted in the press: "We fed it to them and they ate it" (Parenti, 1993, p. 63). This public relations mechanism bolted into action within days of Iraq's invasion, as a navy captain drafted a secret ten-page memo that would become known as "Annex Foxtrot" (MacArthur, 1992). MacArthur reports that the now-declassified memo, first disclosed in the *New York Times* in May 1991, developed the plan for the military operation's information dissemination policy. The goal, endorsed by senior Administration staff including Bush, was to control the flow of information in a manner that supported the operation's political goals and avoided the errors committed during the Vietnam era. The cardinal rule advanced to attain this end was: "News media representatives will be escorted at all times. Repeat, at all times." (MacArthur, 1992, p. 7). The success of the Bush informational control strategy was clear to the news media almost from the outset, yet only token opposition was voiced (MacArthur, 1992). The mainstream media, in effect, merged with the government in supporting the status quo (Mowlana, 1992).

Consequently, "In the seven months beginning with the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990...the Gulf War offered a spectacular opportunity for information and opinion management. In retrospect and on balance, the remarkable control of American consciousness during and after the war must be regarded as a signal achievement of mind management" (Schiller, 1992, p. 22).¹

The issue, then, is the extent to which a behavioral understanding of this "mind management" can contribute to effective countercontrolling responses in the

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future. The behavior analysis clarifies the potential points for intervention. Establishing operations that provide motivation may be altered. The rules that describe contingencies can be more accurately formulated and more responsive to the changing contingencies. The graduated hierarchy through which the aversive discriminative stimuli are presented might be disrupted. However, each of these strategies requires influence within the mainstream media, indicating that a fuller understanding of the phenomenon of propaganda will require a metacontingency analysis (Glenn, 1991) that places the functioning of the media within the larger culture.

Obviously, additional behavioral content analyses beyond the initial effort presented here would be useful to articulate the specific behavioral processes involved in propaganda. Future research should include interrater reliability checks of both the content extracted from the media source and the categorization of the content. In addition, the reliability of the content extracted from one source should be checked against alternate presentations (e.g., other newspapers and newsmagazines) and forms of the media (e.g. television). A sophisticated behavioral content analysis research agenda has the potential to provide a wealth of data from which effective countercontrol skills relevant to propaganda can be developed.

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NOTE

1. Bush actually acknowledged his Administration's successful endeavor in politically motivated, deliberate, "mind management." On ABC's *Nightline* on October 28, 1992, Bush talked candidly about the Gulf War and his popularity during and after it, stating flatly that "we [the Administration] shaped public opinion."